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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
FLORENTINO LOVATO,
Plaintiff and Apprllant,

vs.
BEATRICE FOODS, DBA UTAH
BY-PRODUCTS COMPANY,

Case No.
11453

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by an employee against
his employer to recover damages for a personal injury
sustained during the conrsE> of his employment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was granted and Plaintiff's motion to strike certain defenses raised in Defendant's Answer was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court's Summary Judgment granted in favor of Defendant and of
its denial of Plaintiff's Motion To Strike.
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Defendant disputes the major portion of tlw State.
ment of Facts contained in Plaintiff's written lH'ief filr1i
herein on appeal since it is predominantly in the nahm
of an argunwnt and the purported facts therein stated
are not supported hy the record. Defendant therefon
l'Pstat('S the facts as supported hy the record.
D<->fendant is and for the past several years has been
a business operating in the State of 1Jtah. Pursuant to
Defendant's application, the Industrial Commission oi
Utah issued Defondant a certificate dated January 2G.
19G3, certifying that Defendant was qualified as a selfinsurer under the Utah \Vorkrnen's Compensation A('t
as of February 28, 19G3, and pursuant to Defendant\
subsequent application dated Ft>bruary 17, 1966, the In
dustrial Commission of Utah included Utah By-Prodncb
Company with Beatrice Foods Company as a self-insur('r
under the Act as of Fehrnary 28, 19GG. From then until
the prPsPnt time, the dd'0ndant, Beatrice Foods dba Utah
B~·-Prodnets Company, has been considered on the rrrords of the Industrial Connnission of Utah as a selfinsurer nndPr the Utah \V orkm0n 's Comp<>nsation Act.
Defendant's cPrtification as a S(•lf-insnn~r has nev(~r been
revokPd nor questimwd hy the Indnstrial Commission.
(D.-+ - Affidavit of Yirginia LPah~·)
Since• D<>fendant's <'Prtification hy the Indnstrial
Commission as a self-insnn•r and for s<>veral yPars prior
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th(•reto, tlH' Indm;tria1 Commission has nt-ither required
nor requested that self-insurer companies furnish annual
proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation. It
l1as apparently instead relied upon the records of the
f ndustrial Commission relative to claims made and paid
and th0 annual reports and payment of self-insurers'
tax submitted to tlw Ptah Tax Commission.

In addition to having been certified as a self-insurer
hy the Industrial Commission, Defendant has fully complied with the Jffovisions of Section 35-1-53, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 hy filing annual payroll reports and paying annually to the Tax Commission the special tax
imposed upon self-insurers. (D. 4 .TorgPnsen)

Affidavit of Ray

Also on or ahout September 8, 1968, the

Tndustrial Commission sent to all self-insurer companies
in Ftah a request for a financial statement and defendant
n'sponded b;r filing its financial statement with the Commission on September 12, 19()8.
( )n Octoh0r 1, 1D(i8, Plaintiff sPrvPd Defendant with
a f.luw1110ns and Complaint filed in the District Conrt of
W<'li('r County w1wrt>in hf' statPs that on .June 14, 1968,
l'laintifi' sPVPred his left tltumh at the first joint while
<11wrating a machinP during the course of his employment
with I)pfrndant, and he allegt>s that his injury

~was

caused

liy tliP n<>gligencP of Def0ndant. Ht> furtht>r alleges that
D(·frndant had failed to comply with Sections 35-1-46
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& 35-1-47 of the vVorknwn's Com1wnsation Act relative
to the securing of comp0nsation payments by eitlwr obtaining compensation insurance cov0rage or hy qualifying as a s0lf-insurt>r and that he is tJH'r0fore entitled,

pursuant to Rrction 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
to maintain a civil conrt action for his injury. Defendant filed its Ans1Yt>r to Plaintiff's Complaint wherein
it denied negligence on its part, ass0rted the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk and further asserted that Plaintiff's civil court action for damages from his injnr:v is barred b:- Section 35-l-GO Utah
Code Annotated 1953 which provides that Plaintifh
Pxclusive remedy for his injury is tlw compensation
provided for in the Utah ·workmen's Compensation Act.
(D. 3)

'l1hen on OctobPr 15, 1968, Defendant filed its

Motion for Summary Judgment supported by the Affidavits of Virginia Leahy and Ray Jorgensen relative
to Defendant's status and qualification as a self-insurer.
Plaintiff responded by filing its i\Iotion to Strike the
third, fourth, and fifth defensPs raised in Defendant's
Ans>ver and on November 4, l9G8 Defendant's 1\fotion
for Summary .Judgment and Plaintiff''s J\Iotion to Strike
were l1eard together hefore .Judge Charles G. Cowley .
•Judge Cowle:- took thP motions und<>r advisement and
thereafter by OrdPr dated November 12, 1968, he granted
defendant's Motion for Nmnmary Jndg1nent and dt>nied
Plaintiff's l\f otion to Strike. (D. 8)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT IS A PROPERLY QUALIFIED INSURER UNDER THE UT AH
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND
PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL COURT ACTION RELATIVE TO HIS INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS
BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-60 OF THE ACT.
The record clearly shows that Defendant is a duly
qualified self-insnrE>r under the provisions of the Utah
Work:nwn's Compensation Act and under the Rules and
Hegnlations of the Industrial Commission of Utah. It is
therefore entitled to the benefits of the Act which proYidPs that an employee's exclusive remedy for recovery
of rwrsonal injury damages sustained as a result of an
industrial injury is the compensation provided for by
th<:> Act. 8Pction 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro\'ides:
"The right to reeoyer com1wnsation pursuant to
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by
an Pmplo>·pe wht>ther rPsnlting· in death or not,
shall he the exclnsin rPnwdy against the employer
and shall he the <>xclnsiw rPmedy against any
officer, agPnt or employee of the employer and
tlw liabilities of the 0rnployPr imposed by this
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act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoev~'.r, common law or otherwise, to
such employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or an~- other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurn•d by such employee in the course
of or because of or arising out of his employment,
and no action at law may be maintained against
an employer or against any officer agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident,
injnry or death of an employee."
This action is an attempt by Plaintiff to circumvent
the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act by alleging that DPfendant is not qualified as a self-insnrer under the Act.
Such an allegation is contrary to and nnsnpported b~·
the evidence. As the record shows, Defendant was certified as a self-insurer by the Industrial Commission as of
February 28, 1966. That certification has never been
r\:'voked by the Commission and Defendant has always
properly filed its annual pa~·roll report and paid its selfinsurer's tax to the State 'T'ax Commission. In addition,
pursuant to the Industrial Commission's request, DPfrndant filed its financial statmwnt with the Industrial
Commission on September 12, 1968 and by letter received
by Defendant from the Commission on September 19,
1968, the Commission acknowledgc'd recPipt of Defendant's annual report and stated that Defendant's privilege as a s<'1f-immrer was continuing uninterrntped.
'I'lrns, Defendant has lwen duly qnalified as a selfinsnrer 11nd0r the \Vorknwn's Compensation Act <>ver
sincP it applied for and recPiwd its initial C('rtificate
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from th0 Commission and, at least for the year 1968,
which is the >"ear in which Plaintiff sustained his industrial injnr>- and filPd his action in the lower court, Defendant has furnished its anual report to the Commission
indicating satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay
direct compensation.

The argument contained in Plaintiff's written brief
filed herein takes out of context one sentence of a three
paragraph section of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and attempts to show that there has been technical noncompliance by the defendant of the particular provision in
that SE:'ntence which provides for the filing of annual reports with the Commission. Defendant submits that the
true meaning of that section can only properly be acertained h>- a reading of the Section as a whole and the extraction of one sentmce from the statute tends to disguise
the true intention of the legislature. Section 35-1-46, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 is set out in full as follows:
"Employers except counties, cities, towns and
school districts shall secure compensation to their
(•rnplo>'ees in one of th<> follmYing ways:
(1) B)' insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of snch corn1wnsation with the state insurance fund.

(2) By insuring and keeping insured, the payment of such comepnsations with any stock corporation or mutnal association authorized to
transact thP business of workmen's compensation
insurance in this state.
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(3) By furnishing annually to the commission
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner
and when due as provided for in this title. In such
cases the commission may in its discretion require
the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or
bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are incurred and may at any time
change or modi(\- its findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment such action is neces
sary or desirable to secure or assure a strict
compliance ·with all the provisions of law relating
to the payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse and hospital services, medicines and burial expenses to injured, and to the
dependents of killed employef's. The commission
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a self-insurer.

The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any court of thl'
state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, from further operation of the
employer's business, where the employer has
failed to insure or to keep insured in one of the
three ways in this section provided, the payment
of compensation to injured employees, and upon 11
showing of such failure to insure the court shall
enjoin the further operation of such business until
snch time as such insurance has been obtained b>the employer. The court may enjoin the employN
without requiring bond from the commission.

If the conunission has reason to believe that
an employer of one or more employees is conducting a business without securing the paynwnt of
compensation in one of th1c'. three ways pro,-i<l<'<l
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in this section, the commission may give such employer five days written notice by registered mail
of such noncompliance and if the employer within
said period does not remedy such default, the
commission may file snit as in this section above
provided and the court is empowered, ex parte to
issue without bond a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's
business." (emphasis added)
rr'he wording in sub-paragraph (3) of the above
qnoted section indicates an intention to give the Commission discretion as to what proof of financial ability
or what security it ma)' require from those employers
who elect to become self-insurers. The wording of the
8ection indicates that the Commission should determine
whether or not an employer has properly secured the
payment compensation. In this connection, Defendant
readily agrees with the rules of statutory construction set
ont in the case of Spring Canyon Coal Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206
(1929) "'hich Plaintiff relies upon in his brief. In that
easP, this court stated:
"Among the other well recognized rules applied
in the construction of a statute are these: The
language used mnst be rPad in a sense which
harmonizes with the general purpose and objects
of the statute. . . . "

Jn a1Jplying this rule of statutory infrrprdation it would
he eonsistent with the purpose of the vVorkmen's Com-
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pensation Act for this court to hold that the Industrial
Commission has th1e' discretion to detenniiw wlwther a
company qualifies as a self-insnrer nnder the \Vorlunen's
Compensation Act and to detenninP for itsPlf the extent
of the reports which it deems necessary to reqnjre from
self-insun~rs so as to satisf)- the Commission that tlw
payment of compensation is properly secured. The Commission should certainly he allowed to rely upon its own
records and npon the annual reports filPd by self-insnrers
with the Tax Commission in making its judgments.
The provision in the W orlunen's Comepnsation Act
\\-hich Plaintiff attempts to rely upon in its attempt to
circumvent the provisions of tht' Act is s<>t out in full
at Section 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows:
"Employers who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled
to the benefits of this title durin.r; the period of
noncompliance, hnt shall bP liahle in a civil action
to their ernplo.n'es for damag<>s suffored hy reason of iwrsonal injuries arising out of or in the
course of employment caused hy the wrongful act,
negelct or ddanlt of tlw ernplo.\-er or any of tlw
employer's officers, agents or Pmplo~-ees, and also
to the dependents or personal representatives oi'
snch employees where death results from Sllch injuries. In any such action tlH' cl<'frndant slwli not
a\·ail himself of an~- of the following defonse~:
'l'he defonse of the ft>llow-svrvant rnl<', the (kfrnsl'
of assumption of risk, or the dd<'nse of f'ontrihutory negligence. Proof of th<> injury shall co11stitnt(, prirna facie PVi(l(•nc<> oi' neg-17g<'TIC1' on tl:I'
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part of the employer and the burden shall be upon
the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in snch injnry. And such employers shall
also be subject to the provision of the two sections
next succeeding." (emphasis added)
'J'his provision does not define the "period of noncompliance" nor does Section 35-1-46 of the Act indicate a date
npon which annual reports should be filed or the particular period which such annual reports are intended
to cover. Since Defendant did file its annual report in
September 1968 it can only be assumed that such report
would cover that year. Thus defendant was fully qualified and had fully complied with the statute during the
!"ear 1968 even to the extent of filing an annual report
with the Commission and Plaintiff's civil court action
mnst therefore fail.
The obvious intent of Section 35-1-57 of the Act is
to allow an employee to maintain a civil action against
his employer if the employer has neither qualified as a
self-insurer nor secured insurance coverage with an indeJlC'ndent company or the state insurance fund. This section does not provide that such court action can be maintained simply because the Commission does not insist
upon the filing of reports on an annual basis. If this
eomt

wen~

to adopt Plaintiff's conh·ntion that the mere

failure of tlw Commission to n•qnire annual rt>ports from
~elf-insurers

should have the t>ff eet of suspending or

terminating an employer's status as a self-insurer, the

12
effect of such a ruling would obvionsly han drastic and
unintended consequences not only for this Defendant bnt
for all self-insurers in Utah. Since the Industrial Commission has not required the filing of annual reports
for several years, Plaintiff's position would mean that
no employer who has been deemed by himself and by the
Commission as a self-insurer over the past several years
has in fact been entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act and any employee having a
presently outstanding industrial claim against such an
t•mployer for an injnr>- sustained during the "period of
noncompliance," whatever that term may mean, would
now be allowed to bring a civil action against his employer and attempt to prove fault on thP part of tllP employer. Such a rpsult wonld be manifestly unfair anrl
contrary to thP ohvions pnrposPs of thP \Yorkmen's Com]H'nsation Act.
Plaintiff devotes a major portion of his writtrn
hrief to the argunwnt that the \Vorkmen 's Compensation
Act ·was intended to gin' an employ<'<' security \Yith

f('-

spect to the collection of his damages due to an indn:-:trial injury and that the prnvisions of Suction

35-1-~i

are intended to grant security to an injured employee lJy
allowing him a civil action wlwn sueh sPeurity is not olltained by the emplo>-er's compliancP ·with the 1n·ovision'
of flection 3;-J-1--ffi. Def Pndant tmlnnib that if in fad an
employer is financially incapahl<> of making co1111wnsntion payments m; provided for in tlH· \Y orkm('n 's Colli-
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pensation Act, then certainly he is without sufficient resources to pay any jndgnwnt which an injured employee
ma:· obtain in a ci,·il action brought against his employer
pursuant to provisions of Section 35-1-57. Besides there
is no evidence in this case that the Defendant is unable
or even unwilling to pay the compensation. The true
public policy and intPnded purpose behind the vVorkman's Com1wnsation laws is explained at 58 Am. Jur.,
...\Vorlrmen's Com1wnsation," ~ 2, which is cited in Plaintiff's brief. Tlwre it is pointed out that workman's compensation acts are intended to eliminate costly and burdPnsouH:~ litigation, preYent disharmony between the employer and employee and limit and make fixed the employer's liability for industrial injuries. Certainly the
attempt by Plaintiff in bringing this civil action is in
direct conflict with these stated purposes and Plaintiff
sl1onld not be allowed to dPfeat these purposes.
D0fendant notes that Plaintiff's briPf cites no cases
<:'ither from Utah or any other jurisdiction in which a
court of law has supported his contention either in practice or in principlP. Defendant's research has also reveah~d no such cases. This lack of authority is undoubted!~· d1w to th(• Jack of irwrit in thP ]lOSition which Plaintiff is taking in this cas(•.
CONCLUSION
'I'lw facts in evidence sho\\' that Defendant Las been
cluJ)· qnalifo~d as a self-insurer under tlw Utah ·work.
lll<>n\; Compensation Act since it was originally so certi-
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fied by the Indnstrial Commission. It has ahrnys corn.
plied with all of the rules, regulations and practices of
the Industrial Commission and it has always filed its
annual reports and paid its annual self-insurers tax<'~
to the State Tax Commission.
Section 35-1-4G of the V\T orkmen's Compensation
Act, when taken as a whole, gives the Industrial Commission the discretion to determine who qualifies as a
self-insurer and the extent of records required to mah·
that determination. But even if the failure of the Commission to call for annual reports would have the effeet
of suspending a self-insurer's qualifications under thl'
Act, Section 35-1-57 of the Act only allows an em1Jloyee
to bring a civil court action agaim;t his employc>r "<lming the period of noncompliance" and since Defendant
was in full compliance "With the act for the year of 19G8
hy filing an annual report with tlw Commission on S<'Ptember 12, 19G8, Plaintiff's comt action is barred and
tlu~ trial court properl>' granted Def Pndant's Motion for
Smnmar>· .T ndgmen t.
Plaintiff's action m this casP is simply an attempt
to circumv<>nt tlw legislative intent inherent in tlw
Vtah \Yorkmen's Compensation Act li:v taking out of
context a portion of the statnt<> and arg-ning that technical noncompJiancE~ with that portion should allmY thl'
COlllJH

n::.:at:on provisions of tlw Act to lw discarded. De-

f Pndant has actf>d in complek good faith in qnnlifying
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itself as a self-insurer under the Act and it and other
similar self-insurers should not be denied the benefits
of the Act. Plaintiff has his remedy for his injury by
accepting the compensation benefits provided in the
vVorkmen's Compensation Act.
This Court should affirm the lower court's Summary
.Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
\\'ORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent

